ABSTRACT
This paper addresses a major gap in sustainability transitions research: the role of shocks in shaping transition dynamics. The papers focuses on shocks with traumatic consequences, in particular World War I and II. The paper revisits discussions on the sociotechnical landscape in the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) and Deep Transition framework, offering refined versions of the concepts of systemic and landscape imprinting. It proceeds with a case-study analysis focusing on niche developments during WWI in relation to chemicals and the emergence of chemical warfare, and the lasting impact this shock had on interwar developments, WWII and the post-WWII context. The collective memories of the use of chemical weapons during war and expectations around future use of chemical weapons formed a new backdrop that influenced developments in the food system. Here, food became more tightly intertwined with military imperatives related to preparations regarding the use of chemical and biological weapons. This paper contributes to emerging understandings of how landscape shocks influence sociotechnical change, in particular how these shocks can lead to long lasting tight couplings between socio-technical systems. Two broader research recommendations follow from it. First, more work is needed on the neglected role of war and the military in sociotechnical transitions. Second, in terms of contemporary sustainability challenges, research could consider how landscape events - including the coronavirus pandemic, events related to dramatic biodiversity losses and the climate crisis as well as the traumatic experience of poverty traps and steep rising inequality - may produce trauma and new forms of shared meaning and expectations that impinge on sociotechnical change.
ABSTRACT
Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues.